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SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW FOR THE YEAR 1946-1947"
I. BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
CORPORATIONS
M OST OF THE significant cases during the past year relating to
corporate law dealt with problems concerning the rights and
obligations of shareholders. For example, two apparently con-
flicting decisions have been rendered by the Appellate Court for
the First District on the point of the right to extend the duration
of a voting trust. In each instance the voting trust agreement,
adopted under corporate reorganization proceedings, provided
that the arrangement should "terminate in any event" on a
designated date although it might be terminated sooner if desired.
A subsequent provision in each agreement indicated that the same
might be amended, altered or modified in the manner therein indi-
cated, but there was nothing in the amendment provision expressly
limiting the power of amendment with respect to the expiration
of the trust. In each instance, the trustees and a majority of the
beneficiaries approved an extension of the arrangement beyond
the original term and minority interests sued to have the exten-
* The present survey is not intended in any sense to be a complete commentary
upon, or, annotation of, the cases decided by the Illinois courts during the past
year, but is published rather for the purpose of calling attention merely to cases
and developments believed significant and interesting. The period covered is that
of the judicial year, embracing from 394 Ill. 1 to 397 Ill. 399; from 329 Ill. App.
244 to 332 Ill. App. 161. Statutory changes having general interest are also in-
cluded.
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sion declared invalid.' The First Division of the court, in Olson v.
Rossetter,2 held the purported amendment invalid and ordered
the trial court to dissolve the voting trust. The Third Division,
however, in Russ v. Blair,3 came to a contrary conclusion and
regarded the extension as being valid. The only comparable case
noted, that of Bechtel v. Rorick,4 reached this last-mentioned con-
clusion by a divided court, so it is worth noting that leave to
appeal has been granted in each instance and the apparent in-
consistency is about to be resolved.
There is undoubted utility in the formation and existence of
voting trusts as a desirable method of insuring, at least for a time,
some permanence in control. Hitherto, except in cases of reorgani-
zation, there has been no statutory authority warranting the
adoption of that device by shareholders of corporations organized
in Illinois. A new statute now permits the creation of voting
trusts among existing shareholders, at least for a ten-year period,
although it requires that a copy of the trust agreement be depos-
ited with the corporation and be made subject to inspection as are
the other books and records of the company. 5 There may, however,
be grave doubts as to the constitutionality of the new provisions
for the state constitution directs that the general assembly shall
provide that "every stockholder shall have the right to vote" at
least with respect to the election of directors 6 and earlier decisions
have indicated that any attempts to sever voting power from
ownership would be invalid.7
1 The only apparent difference in the cases might lie in the fact that in Russ v.
Blair, 330 Ill. App. 571, 71 N. E. (2d) 838 (1947), the court indicated any
beneficiary was entitled to withdraw from the trust and receive voting stock at
will. No point was made as to this distinction, if in fact it is one. The headnote
to the abstract opinion in Metcoff v. Farr, 330 Ill. App. 432, 71 N. E. (2d) 366
(1947), would indicate that much the same problem was involved therein, but
leave to appeal from that decision was denied.
2 330 Ill. App. 304, 71 N. E. (2d) 556 (1947).
3 330 Ill. App. 571, 71 N. E. (2d) 838 (1947).
4 65 Ohio App. 455, 30 N. E. (2d) 451 (1940).
5 Laws 1947, p. 677-8, H. B. 22; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 32, § 157.30a. For the
purpose of permitting inspection of the books and records of the corporation itself,
requisite amendment of the inspection provision has also been made. See Laws
1947, pp. 678-9, H. B. 634; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 32, § 157.45.
6 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. XI, § 3.
7 Luthy v. Ream, 270 Ill. 170, 110 N. E. 373, Ann. Cas. 1917B 368 (1915). See
also Partridge, "Corporate Capital Structure Under Illinois Law," 24 CHICAGO
KENT LAW REviw 303 (1946), particularly pp. 327-30.
SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW-196-1947
Notice was taken last year of the decision of the Appellate
Court in the case of Doggett v. North American Life Insurance
Company of Chicago8 wherein it was held that the provisions of
the Business Corporation Act respecting the shareholder's right
of inspection, including the penalties there prescribed, applied to
stockholders of insurance companies even though the latter are
incorporated under a different statute. The Illinois Supreme
Court, after leave to appeal had been granted, reversed that hold-
ing insofar as it imposed penalties on the officers refusing to honor
the demand for inspection 9 but did recognize that, in the absence
of special legislation on the subject, the shareholder in such a
company was entitled to the aid furnished by a common-law writ
of mandamus. The earlier case of Venner v. Chicago City Rail-
way Company"° which had treated railroad companies as being
within the ambit of the general corporation act was not followed.11
Derivative actions by shareholders also received attention in
two cases. In one of them, that of Winger v. Chicago City Bank
& Trust Company,12 the Supreme Court approved the maintain-
ance of a derivative suit by the policyholders of an assessment
insurance company against its directors and officers to compel
restoration of funds and property wrongfully withdrawn. It
deemed such action proper, even though control over litigation
involving insurance companies is largely vested in the Director
of Insurance, 13 on the ground that the litigation was not such as
would interfere with the prosecution of the business of the com-
pany but rather was designed to enforce fiduciary duties owed by
the directors of the type made clear in the leading case of Farwell
v. Pyle-National Electric Headlight Company.14 The recognized
8328 Ill. App. 613, 66 N. E. (2d) 747 (1946), noted in 25 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEw 2.
9 396 111. 354, 71 N. E. (2d) 686 (1947).
10 246 Il1. 170, 92 N. E. 643, 138 Am. St. Rep. 229 (1910).
11 Absence of any specific provision in the Insurance Code, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947. Ch.
73, would seem to be a defect that would bear correction.
12 394 Ill. 94, 67 N. E. (2d) 265 (1946).
13 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 73, § 813.
14 289 Il!. 157, 124 N. E. 449, 10 A. L. R. 363 (1919).
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right of the shareholder to maintain such derivative actions, 5
however, is necessarily subjeci to applicable rules of the court in
which such suit is maintained. Objection was made, therefore, in
H F G Company v. Pioneer Publishing Company,16 that the plain-
tiff, using the federal court on the ground of diversity of citizen-
ship, could not maintain the action in question inasmuch as it was
not a registered shareholder at the time of the wrongs complained
about. 7 The court, upon finding that the plaintiff was not a share-
holder of record but actually held the full equitable title to the
shares, which had been issued in the name of its nominee, never-
theless decided that an equitable shareholder had as much or even
a better right to sue than would the holder of a bare legal title.
As the corporation involved was one organized in Illinois, the
court turned to the law of this state and could find no indication
that the decision in Green v. Hedenburg1 had been in any way
changed by the fact that the present Business Corporation Act
defines a shareholder as one who is "a holder of record of shares
in a corporation."1 9 Such definition, said the court, applied only
for the purpose of the statute in question and had no relation to
proceedings conducted independently thereof.
Evident dissatisfaction on the part of shareholders in state
banks with the double liability imposed by the state constitution,20
plus the fact that other methods at remedying the situation have
failed,2' has led to renewed efforts before the courts to bring about
nullification of that liability. In Henrys v. Raboin22 the attack
took the form of a challenge of the constitutionality of the provi-
15 That there are limitations on the exercise of such right, particularly when
claimed by a transferee of shares whose transferor might be estopped from suing,
see Russell v. Louis Melind Co., 331 Ill. App. 182, 72 N. E. (2d) 869 (1947).
16162 F. (2d) 536 (1947).
17 Rule 23(b), Fed. Rules of Civ. Pro., 28 U. S. C. A. foll. § 723c, provides that
in an action brought to enforce a secondary right, the complaint shall ". . . aver
(1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder at the time of the transaction of which he
complains.. .."
18 159 Ill. 489, 42 N. E. 851, 50 Am. St. Rep. 178 (1896).
19 111. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 32, § 157.2(g).
20 Il. Const. 1870, Art. XI, § 6.
21 See 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvmw 216, particularly p. 219, note 30.
22395 Ill. 118, 69 N. E. (2d) 491 (1946).
SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW-1946-1947
sion in question, and of the statute predicated thereon, 23 on
grounds not heretofore presented. The stockholder there sued
asserted that the imposition of double liability was improper
because (1) the state provision was so worded as to be applicable
to stockholders of both state and national banks or, in the alterna-
tive, (2) if valid when adopted, had become invalid by reason of
subsequent federal enactments which had resulted in producing
such inequality between shareholders in state and national banks
as to amount to a violation of rights guaranteed by the federal
constitution. Neither contention succeeded. The Illinois Supreme
Court, although finding that the language was broad enough to
include both state and national bank stockholders, answered the
first objection by excluding national bank stockholders from the
operation thereof on the ground that such was necessary to sus-
tain the constitutionality of the law and the two classes were not
so inextricably interwoven as to require a decision that the whole
section was void for all purposes. The second contention was met
by noting that any discrepancy between the rights and liabilities
of the two classes was produced by competition introduced by
federal law rather than by state action2" and was, although un-
fortunate, a necessary corollary of the dual system of government
under which each government has the right to operate in the
same territory.
Although essentially a problem of construing contractual
language, the case of Mueller v. Howard Aircraft Corporation25
should receive the attention of corporate officials, particularly
those concerned with the problems which might arise from efforts
to redeem outstanding corporate securities. The plaintiff therein
was the holder of one of defendant's convertible debentures which
the company had the right, on notice, to call, for payment prior
to maturity date. Due notice of call was given, but funds sufficient
to cover payment were not deposited with the paying agent named
in the indenture. Unaware of the fact that his debenture had
23 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 16Y2, § 6.
24 Only state action Is condemned by the Fourteenth Amendment: Corrigan v.
Buckley, 271 U. S. 322, 46 S. Ct. 521, 70 L. Ed. 969 (1926).
25 329 Ill. App. 570, 70 N. E. (2d) 203 (1946), noted in 17 Corp. J. 324.
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been called, plaintiff sought to exercise the conversion privilege.
His request was denied on the ground that the privilege had been
nullified by expiration of the time fixed by the redemption notice.
When plaintiff tendered his debenture to the paying agent, he was
told that he would be obliged to leave the same for a sufficient
length of time to requisition funds from the debtor corporation
for the purpose of making payment inasmuch as no funds had
been deposited with them. Plaintiff again demanded the right to
convert his debenture into stock of the corporation and, upon
further refusal, sued to recover damages equal to the market
value of the shares to which he would have been entitled. 26 It was
held that plaintiff should have been granted a summary judgment
for the language of the redemption provision was found to be
such that the giving of the call notice alone did not destroy the
conversion privilege but that a deposit of the redemption price
was also an essential condition precedent to that end. It was
also said that a provision requiring "presentation and surrender"
of the debenture before payment would be made contemplated
nothing more than that "surrender" and "payment" were to be
mutual and concurrent acts.
Any intimation in the case of In re Peer Manor Building Cor-
poration27 that a disssolved corporation might obtain beneficial
relief through a petition to reorganize under Chapter X of the
Bankruptcy Act 28 by claiming to be an "unincorporated company
or association," 29 especially after the lapse of time within which
proceedings may be instituted despite dissolution,3" has been mini-
mized by the decision in In re Midwest Athletic Club.," That case
limits the earlier decision to situations wherein the dissolved
corporation has continued to function as a business by reason of
26 That measure of damage was said to be appropriate in Denney v. Cleveland
& Pittsburg R. R. Co., 28 Ohio St. 108 (1875).
27 134 F. (2d) 839 (1943).
28 11 U. S. C. A. § 501 et seq.
2 Ibid., App. § 1(8).
3o Ill. nev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 32, § 157.94. See also Walden Home Builders, Inc. v.
Schmit, 326 Iln. App. 386, 62 N. E. (2d) 11 (1945), noted in 24 CHICAGo-KENT LAW
REvmw 345.
31 161 F. (2d) 1005 (1947).
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the fact that its members have carried on joint operations. The
mere fact that title to the corporate real estate, after dissolution,
had devolved on the shareholders as tenants in common was
treated as insufficient to show any "association" between the
several owners and the operation of such real estate by a receiver,
acting as an arm of the court in certain foreclosure proceedings,
was held not to constitute the "doing of business" in the corpo-
rate name. No corporation existing, no matter how loosely the
term "corporation" might be defined, it was held that reorganiza-
tion proceedings could not be maintained.
In addition to statutory changes already noted, the recent
session of the legislature amended the Community Currency Ex-
change Act in some small particulars, principally by exempting
concerns who act as payroll disbursing agents for employers and
by increasing the amount of the bond required for a license ;32
has amended some, and added other, sections in the Building Loan
and Homestead Association Act ;33 has acted to validate convey-
ances heretofore made by such associations when in voluntary
liquidation ;34 has attempted to expand the investment powers of
credit unions ;35 has overhauled the laws relating to hospital serv-
ice corporations 36 and medical service plan companies ;37 has clari-
fied the definition provisions in the statute relating to neighbor-
hood redevelopment;3 s has removed the acreage restrictions on
the amounts of land which may be acquired by religious corpora-
tions;39 has made a minor amendment to the Trust Companies
32 Laws 1947, pp. 306-9, H. B. 160; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 16 , §§ 31-3 and 35.
33 Laws 1947, pp. 663-76, H. B. 401, 619 and 699; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 32,
§ § 222-3. 229, 231i, 240, 245-6, 253 and 255a-1.
34 Laws 1947, pp. 676-7, S. B. 75; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 32, § 257q.
35 Laws 1947, p. 679, S. B. 594; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 32. § 476. The enrolled
bills appears defective in that some lines of type appear to have been dropped
therefrom.
-16 Laws 1947, pp. 679-82, H. B. 791; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 32, § 551 et seq.
.37 Laws 1947, pp. 683-5, H. B. 792; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 32, § 563 et seq.
38 Laws 1947, pp. 685-7, H. B. 224; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 32, § 550.3.
39 Laws 1947, pp. 687-8, H. B. 39; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 32, § 164 et seq., par-
ticularly §§ 171, 174, 181 and 185. The extent of land which may be so acquired
is so much as the religious corporation "may deem necessary," rather than the
limitation that it be "appropriate to enable it to accomplish" its purposes, which is
the limitation attached to business corporations under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch.
32, § 157.5(d).
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Act relating to trusts for the perpetual care of burial lots ;40 and
has added an additional ground for the involuntary dissolution of
corporations organized not for profit.4 1 The new ground involves
the failure to use funds for the purpose solicited or the fraudulent
solicitation or use of money obtained by solicitation.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
It would scarcely be thought that any question existed about
the rule that an agency may not be created for the purpose of
doing criminal or tortious acts, yet in Tuttle v. Forsberg42 such a
question was raised in connection with the determination of lia-
bility for injuries caused by reckless gunfire. One of the defend-
ants therein, a police officer, had been requested by the manager
of the other defendant, an automobile livery concern, to "lock up"
,a customer who had failed to return a rented vehicle. While the
officer was confirming the authority to make the arrest, the default-
ing .customer fled and was recaptured only after the officer had
pursued him and fired the shots that caused plaintiff's injury.
Plaintiff, relying on Schramko v. Boston Store of Chicago,4 3
claimed that the request that the officer "lock up" the customer
was "an implied request to take any and all steps necessary to
complete the arrest" and that, therefore, he acted as agent or
servant of the livery concern when he recklessly caused the in-
juries. The court, however, characterized this theory as "far
fetched, indeed, and it is certainly not supported by the law." '44
Nothing in the request of the manager did authorize, or could
have authorized, the officer to resort to gun-play in a wild, wan-
tonly reckless and illegal manner to accomplish the purpose of
the request, hence he could not be deemed an agent for that
purpose.
Problems of the enforcibility of agency contracts also have
led the courts to analyze the circumstances surrounding the crea-
40 Laws 1947, pp. 688-9, S. B. 655; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 32, § 288a.
41 Laws 1947, p. 682, S. B. 137; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 32, § 163a49.
42 331 Il1. App. 503, 73 N. E. (2d) 861 (1947).
43243 Ill. App. 251 (1927).
'4 331 Ill. App. 503 at 510, 73 N. E. (2d) 861 at 864.
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tion of agency relationships. One common cause of unenforcibility
is, of course, vagueness and indefiniteness of terms concerning
prices of goods or services involved. Agency contracts involving
future delivery of goods frequently leave the element of price
open for determination at a later date, and there seems to be no
objection to such failure to specifically fix prices so long as it is
clear from the contract, interpreted as a whole, that some method
has been selected and agreed upon for definitely ascertaining
prices when the need arises. 45 A contract of this type was involved
in Anderson &. Brown Company v. Anderson 6 where defendant had
been engaged as agent to sell plaintiff's electrical equipment. By
the terms of the contract the agent agreed to pay "40% of the
net price" when the order was forwarded and the balance "when
said order is complete and ready for shipment, but before deliv-
ery; the terms to be net cash and the price of each item is to be
agreed upon in writing by the parties hereto, depending on the
size and cost of material." Such terms, the court felt, left the
matter of price determination too indefinite to permit specific
performance notwithstanding the fact that the parties appeared
to have succeeded in operating under its terms for a year.
In one decision, that in the case of Minters v. Mid-City Man-
agement Corporation,47 the Appellate Court found it necessary to
recognize limitations on the "assumption of risk" doctrine. That
case involved a suit by a tenant against a landlord for injuries
sustained through slipping and falling on a floor in a hotel covered
with soapy water being mopped by a servant of the landlord. The
landlord's defense that his tenant had assumed the risk when she
noticed that the floor was being mopped was not allowed. Even
though general authorities were cited to show that the assumption
of risk doctrine might properly be extended beyond the master
and servant relationship, the court pointed out that the Illinois
Supreme Court had confined its application to the contractual
45 See Buggs v. Ford Motor Co., 113 F. (2d) 618 (1940), and discussions in
Prosser, "Open Price Contracts for Sale of Goods," 16 Minn. L. Rev. 733 (1931),
Williston, Sales, § 167-8. See also Section 9 of the Uniform Sales Act, Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1947, Ch. 1212, § 9.
46 161 F. (2d) 674 (1947).
47 331 Ill. App. 64, 72 N. E. (2d) 729 (1947). Leave to appeal has been denied.
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relation of master and servant so refused to recognize it as a
defense where that relationship was not present.
The "assumption of risk" defense, insofar as it was available
to railroads, was abolished by the 1939 amendment to the Federal
Employers Liability Act,4 and the decisions of the courts since
then have been in harmony with the liberal tendencies displayed
by Congress.4 9 But, even in actions brought under the federal
statute, problems still arise with respect to plaintiff's responsi-
bility to show a causal connection between the defendant's negli-
gence and the injury complained about. In O'Brien v. Chicago &
North Western Railway Company,"° for example, plaintiff's de-
cedent, a railroad fireman, had been ordered by his engineer to
seek shelter in a steam-heated compartment provided for that
purpose and located in the locomotive tender. To get to the
shelter it was necessary to crawl over the top of the tender and,
during the course of this act, the decedent was apparently knocked
from the moving train by projections from a viaduct under which
the engine passed. Plaintiff contended that evidence of the old
and leaky condition of pipes and spouts on water-towers main-
tained by defendant for use by its employees when filling locomo-
tive water tanks, with resultant overflow and splashing of water
on the decedent's clothes in sub-zero weather, established that
defendant had failed in its duty to furnish a reasonably safe place
to work and was the proximate cause of the deceased being ordered
to do the act which resulted in his death. Although evidence of
the precise cause and manner of death was largely circumstantial,
it was held that recovery against the employer should not be
denied.
Analysis of the agent's fiduciary responsibility to his prin-
cipal has often assumed difficult proportions when the question
has been raised in connection with activity leading to the termi-
nation of the agency relationship. In Pittsburgh Equitable Meter
4845 U. S. C. A. § 54.
49 See, for example, Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U. S. 645, 66 S. Ct. 740, 90 L. Ed. 916
(1946) ; Tennant v. Peoria & P. U. R. Co., 321 U. S. 29, 64 S. Ct. 409, 88 L. Ed.
520 (1944).
50 329 Ill. App. 382, 68 N. E. (2d) 638 (1946).
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Compay v. Paul C. Loeber & Company,5 1 the defendant real
estate broker was given a ninety-day exclusive agency to obtain
a purchaser for land owned by plaintiff at a designated price.
Prior to the expiration of the ninety days, defendant sought and
obtained from plaintiff an option to buy the property in question
for a lower figure. At the time the option was secured, defendant
made full disclosure of all facts then known relating to the subject
of the option. Thereafter, defendant's efforts in advertising the
property resulted in the receipt of an offer from a prospective
purchaser to buy at a figure substantially larger than the option
price. Defendant exercised the option and resold the property to
the stranger-purchaser. As the exercise of the option was not
accompanied by a full disclosure of the impending resale, plaintiff
sued to recover the alleged secret profit. Defendant contended
that it had no fiduciary duty which extended beyond the agency
and that that relationship had terminated when plaintiff executed
the option for a valuable consideration. The court held, however,
that the agency was not revoked but that it continued until either
defendant exercised the option or the ninety-day period expired.
As a practical matter, the court said, the defendant's negotiations
with the prospective purchaser were based on defendant's author-
ity as plaintiff's agent and not on any assumption that defendant
owned the land. In the absence of any showing that the parties
intended the agency to be revoked or that the option was abso-
lutely inconsistent with the continuing fiduciary duty of the
optionee, it was held that the duty remained.
The lien of an agent upon the property or funds of his prin-
cipal for reimbursement for necessary expenses, advances or
liabilities incurred on behalf of the principal may be created by
any of several methods but, in recognizing the existence of an
agent's lien, it is usually said that the courts favor specific rather
than general ones. Because of this, the question arose in Dietch-
man v. Korach5 - as to whether clothing lent by the principal to
the agent for purpose of display to prospective customers could
51 160 F. (2d) 721 (1947).
-2 330 Ill. App. 365, 71 N. E. (2d) 367 (1947).
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be made the subject of a lien for reimbursement of travelling
expenses incurred by the agent. No Illinois precedents seem to
exist on the point. There being no statute or special agreement
or trade custom upon which to base a lien and as the agent's skill
and efforts had in no way enhanced the value of the goods lent to
him, the court denied the right to either a special or general lien
in favor of the agent.
LABOR LAW
The wave of new labor legislation which swept the country
within the last year left this state untouched. Except for minor
changes in the Unemployment Compensation Act,53 no important
statutory enactments have occurred. But the courts have been
called upon to determine a number of matters.
Right to unemployment compensation benefits, for example,
was involved in the case of Local Union No. 11 v. Gordon 4 where
the problem was whether a controversy over the interpretation
of a written contract covering the time of payment of past-due
vacation pay, accompanied by the employees' concerted refusal to
work in order to compel compliance with their construction of
the contract, constituted a labor dispute within the meaning of
Section 7(d) of the Unemployment Compensation Act.5  The
union concerned had a closed-shop agreement with the employer,
a coal-mining company, calling for vacation pay. It was claimed
that an installment of this vacation pay became due on August
28th but the company asserted it was not due until September
28th. When, on August 28th, the workers received their regular
current pay but not the vacation pay installment, a "pit commit-
tee" was formed which requested immediate payment thereof
under threat to close the mine if the demand was not met. Not
being paid, the miners quit and stayed out until September 11th,
53 Changes appear in Laws 1947, pp. 928-30, S. B. 285, pp. 930-53, H. B. 799,
and pp. 953-61, S. B. 241; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947. Ch. 48, § 217 et seq. There has -also
been a revision of the statute relating to washroom facilities necessary in certain
occupations: Laws 1947, p. 961, H. B. 276; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 48, § 98 et seq.
54 396 Ill. 293, 71 N. E. (2d) 637 (1947). Smith, J., wrote a short dissenting
opinion.
55 111. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 48, § 223(d).
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at which time the differences were composed.5 6 A claim for
unemployment compensation benefits for the period mentioned was
denied in the lower tribunals on the ground that the unemploy-
ment was due to a stoppag of work resulting from a labor
dispute.-"
The union argued, before the Illinois Supreme Court, that the
controversy in question was not a true labor dispute since it
related to back pay rather than to the more common demands for
higher wages, shorter hours or better working conditions. It
asserted that, as a consequence of the company's refusal to pay
the vacation installment when it fell due, the miners had no
assurance that it would ever be paid, hence they became involun-
tarily unemployed. The Supreme Court, nevertheless, affirmed
the earlier holdings pointing out that although the term "labor
dispute "is not expressly defined in the act, the statutory declara-
tion of policy5" showed clearly that it was the intention of the
legislature to grant unemployment compensation to those who
were involuntarily unemployed. As the controversy concerned
terms and conditions of employment and as the workers refused
to work for the purpose of coercing the company into abandoning
its own and adopting the union's construction of the contract,
their conduct was said to amount to a strike, hence was a labor
dispute within the purview of Section 7(d) of the act.59
Whether labor unions have the right to engage in concerted
activities against self-employers was made the subject of a deci-
sion of the Appellate Court for the Second District in Dinoffria
v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters and Chauffeurs Local
56 During the shut-down of the mine, no picket line was formed and the com-
pany had sufficient orders on hand to keep the mine in continuous operation.
57111. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 48, § 223(d), so far as relevant, provides: "An in-
dividual shall be ineligible for benefits ... (d) For any week with respect to which
it is found that his total or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work
which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment, or other
premises at which he is or was last employed ..
58 Ibid., § 217.
59 The court, 396 I1. 293 at 302, 71 N. E. (2d) 637 at 641-2, said: "Where
action is taken by either a labor organization or employer having a bearing upon
a controversy as to wages, or conditions of employment, a labor dispute has
developed." It also note that its opinion should not be construed as authority
for the prosecution of unemployment compensation claims by unions.
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Union No. 179. 60 The plaintiff there concerned, self-employed oper-
ators of retail gasoline service stations, sought relief in the form
of an injunction and money damages from the union which was in
the process of boycotting the stations because of the refusal of the
plaintiffs to join the union. Such conduct resulted in substantial
injuries to the plaintiffs as they were not able to obtain the neces-
sary supplies for the carrying on of their trade. The trial court
denied both injunctive relief and the claim for damages but the
Appellate Court reversed, declaring that while the scope of per-
missible conduct by working men acting in concert to improve
their economic position had steadily expanded yet in no case had
a court sanctioned or been called on to approve peaceful picketing
or boycotting or other conduct of a labor union where it had been
directed against a self-employer who hired no other persons."'
Another interesting case pertaining to labor relations is that
of Montgomery Ward & Company v. United Retail, Wholesale &
Department Store Employees, C. I. 0.,62 which case deals with
the right to enjoin against defamatory statements of a union con-
cerning the employer, but as that case is dealt with more exten-
sively elsewhere in this survey the existence of the decision is
merely noted here.
WORKMEN 1'S COMPENSATION
The problem of subrogation for payments made by virtue of
workmen's compensation laws, presented by the case of Smith v.
Clavey Ravinia Nurseries Incorporated,33 was characterized by
the Illinois Appellate Court as one of first impression not only in
60331 Ill. App. 129, 72 N. E. (2d) 635 (1947), noted in 25 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REvIEw 343. Writ of error has been granted.
61 The court made no mention of decisions expressly sanctioning union activities
against self-employers, such as Cafeteria Employees Union v. Anjelos, 320 U. S.
293, 64 S. Ct. 95, 88 L. Ed. 58 (1943) ; Bakery & Pastry Drivers, etc. v. Wohl, 315
U. S. 769, 62 S. Ct. 816, 86 L. Ed. 1178 (1942); Baker v. Retail Clerks' I. Pro-
tective Ass'n, 313 Ill. App. 432, 40 N. E. (2d) 571 (1942) ; Naprawa v. Chicago
Flat Janitors' Union Local No. 1, 315 Ill. App. 328, 43 N. E. (2d) 198 (1942),
appeal dismissed on the ground the order Was interlocutory 382 Ill. 124, 46 N. E.
(2d)2 27 (1943).
62330 Ill. App. 49, 70 N. E. (2d) 75 (1946). Appeal pending.
63329 Ill. App. 548. 69 N. E. (2d) 921 (1946), noted in 47 Col. L. Rev. 512, 35
Ill. B. J. 313, and 14 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 512.
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Illinois but also in the entire United States. An employee of the
defendant there concerned, an Illinois corporation doing business
in Wisconsin, had suffered a compensable injury in Wisconsin.
The defendant's original insurance carrier became insolvent and
was succeeded by a second carrier which also became insolvent.
Awards were entered in favor of the employee and against the
defendant and the last-mentioned carrier. After the awards re-
mained unpaid for sixty days, pursuant to Wisconsin law,64 the
present plaintiff, as custodian of the security fund and in com-
pliance with statutory mandate, paid the same. He then filed suit
in Illinois seeking reimbursement. The complaint set out causes
of action based on both common-law and statutory subrogation.
The trial court dismissed the suit, but the Appellate court reversed
and held that a good cause of action existed under either theory.
Where the plaintiff, under compulsion of a statute, pays an obliga-
tion that is primarily that of the defendant, the equitable doctrine
of subrogation as known to the common law is applicable and
appropriate. Moreover, since the Wisconsin statute provides that
"the state treasurer as custodian of the funds shall proceed to
recover the sum of all liabilities of such carrier assumed by such
funds, from such carrier . . . its receiver . . . employers, and
all others liable, and may prosecute an action or proceeding there-
for," there is subrogation by virtue of the statute.
The defendant also contended that the carrier's payment of
about one per cent. of the premium into the Wisconsin state
security fund constituted a plan of reinsurance whereby the state
reinsured the carrier's risks, for which reason there could be no
subrogation. Upon analysis of the purpose of the state fund, this
idea evaporated. Another frivolous contention was that since the
statute authorized the state treasurer to proceed against the car-
rier the result was to deprive the employer of his right to do so.
The answer to this empty contention was that if the employer
paid the award it could have sued and it would then have been
unnecessary for the state treasurer to sue at all. A further point
dealt with the question of whether Illinois should give full faith
64 Wis. Gen. Stats. 1945, § 102.65(1).
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and credit to the Wisconsin statute, but comment thereon is not
appropriate here. There is no doubt, under the circumstances,
but what the Appellate Court has forwarded the effectiveness of
the doctrine of subrogation and rightly so.
In Sweitzer v. Industrial Commission,6 5 a question arose as to
whether or not one who seeks judicial review of a decision under
the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act must exhaust his admin-
istrative remedies before being privileged to appeal to the courts.
It was held that any person dissatisfied with the decision of an
arbitrator must seek review before the commission prior to turn-
ing to the courts and, until this is done, the courts are lacking in
jurisdiction to review. W-hile the Administrative Review Act 6
does not specifically apply to workmen's compensation proceed-
ings, it is indicative of a legislative intention to require exhaustion
of administrative remedies and that fact may have aided the court
resolve any doubts which may have existed as to the proper con-
struction of Section 19 of the statute.
Whether the failure of a minor to give notice of injury within
the statutory period precludes allowance of an award of compen-
sation was answered in the affirmative by the Illinois Supreme
Court in Ferguson v. Industrial Commission.6 7 The question had
not been directly presented heretofore, although in Walgreen
Company v. Industrial Commission 8 the court had held that the
limitation of time within which an application for an award should
be made did not run against a minor so long as he was without a
guardian. After that case, however, the statute was amended so
as to read: "In case of mental incapacity of the employee or any
dependents of a deceased employee who may be entitled to com-
pensation under the provisions of this Act, the limitation of time
by this Act provided shall not begin to run against said mental
incompetents until a conservator or guardian has been ap-
pointed: ' '69 The court held that, as minors were not specifically
65 394 Ill. 141, 68 N. E. (2d) 290 (1946), noted in 25 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEw
2611 35 Ill. B. J. 172.
66 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 264 et seq.
67 397 Ill. 348, 74 N. E. (2d) 539 (1947).
68 323 Il. 194, 153 N. E. 831 (1926).
69 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 48, § 161.
SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW-19J16-1947
included in the provision relating to incompetents and as the
General Assembly had elsewhere declared that minor employees
shall be considered the same as adult employees, the exclusion of
minors from the saving clause was intentional.
Legislative cognizance of the rise in both wages and living
cost is evidenced by changes in both the Workmen's Compensation
Act,0 and the Occupational Diseases Act 71 through which increases
in the amounts to be awarded for occupational injuries are
granted.
II. CONTRACTS
The field of general contract law was barren of significant
decisions, as is usually the case, but some cases dealing with rather
specialized branches of that subject are worthy of notice.
INSURANCE
It is a well-settled rule that ambiguities in an insurance con-
tract will be read in favor of the insured.' This rule was expanded
to the breaking point in Hooker v. New York Life Insurance Com-
pany2 wherein the court held that the beneficiary of an insured
was entitled to double indemnity benefits though the facts of the
insured's death seemed clearly to bring it within an exception
clause. The deceased met his death through accident while a
participant in maneuvers in New Zealand with the United States
Marine Corps Reserve during time of war. The defendant ad-
mitted no liability under the double indemnity provision of the
life policy, contending that the cause of death was within the
policy exception which read: ". . . provided, however, that such
double indemnity benefit shall not be payable if the insured's
death resulted, directly or indirectly, from . . . war or any act
incident thereto." Plaintiff contended the clause, by its very
wording, applied only when the insured met his death in actual
70 Laws 1947, pp. 962-75, H. B. 979; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 48, §§ 144-5.
71 Laws 1947, pp. 908-28, H. B. 980; Il. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 48, §§ 172.7-8.
1 Jabara v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 280 Il. App. 147 (1935).
2 66 F. Supp. 313 (1946), noted in 25 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw 171, 12 Mo.
L. Rev. 212 and 25 Tex. L. Rev. 313.
